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In his paper, Thomas Goodnight contributes to the discussion on strategic
manoeuvring within institutional argumentative exchanges starting from the idea
that the obligations imposed and possibilities provided by the particular institution
in which the exchange takes place define the way arguers resolve their differences of
opinion. Argumentative exchanges between doctor and patient involving direct-to-
consumer drug advertising are given as an example.
In this commentary I will focus on Goodnight’s employment of the concept of
reasonableness and show how it differs from the concept of reasonableness adopted in
the pragma-dialectical theory, arguing that the latter can be instrumental in accounting
more systematically for argumentation both within and among institutions.
Goodnight’s basic starting point in his endeavour is that rationality comes from
the institution. It is ‘reducible neither to interactions which are regulated by
conversational norms nor to the obligations of achieving effects on opinion through
persuasive exchange.’ ‘What counts as reasonable thinking and valid judgment is’,
according to Goodnight, ‘grounded in the logic of the institution.’
By taking account of the type of reasonableness advocated by Goodnight, one may
say that his endeavour is not so much to show how in a pragma-dialectical sense the
arguers’ strategic manoeuvring within an institutional context is affected by the
contingencies of the institutional situations but to show how this strategic manoeu-
vring is actually defined by the institutional context because it is this institutional
context that determines what is reasonable and what is not. In fact, the idea for this
conception of strategic manoeuvring is understandable to some extent because it is
clearly based on the belief that in institutional settings arguers also have to balance
their personal ambitions with the norms imposed by the institution within which the
argumentation takes place. So what is there to be said against this conception?
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In my view Goodnight’s conception of strategic manoeuvring relies too heavily
on the reasonableness of the institution. No matter how powerful and enduring a
given institution may be, it would be too risky to rely solely on the institution to
determine for us what is reasonable and what is not. A general and more
encompassing form of rationality, such as the one advocated by the pragma-
dialectical theory, remains necessary. Goodnight does show awareness of this fact
when he says that ‘[i]n cases of conflict, institutional advocates draw upon higher
order principles of argument to criticize the norms of reasoning in organizations,’
but this, in as far as I understand Goodnight’s analysis, only applies to cases
involving conflicts between different institutions and to cases where arguers come to
realise that the norms of their own institutions may not be acceptable to an arguer
belonging to the rival institution.
In my opinion, even within the same institution arguers might be assumed to appeal
to some higher conception of reasonableness in addressing one another. Besides, the
fact that arguers assume different roles within different institutions at the same time
can also be a reason why the institutionally ‘bounded rationality’ is potentially
undermined by the institution-independent rationality. Assuming that arguers rely on
this higher form of rationality in their routine institutional argumentation may explain
why arguers are able to move between different institutions and become good arguers
within the receiving institution. In fact, for what one may call a multi-institutional
agent (an agent functioning within various institutions) codes of rationality adopted
within an institution may make sense and are acceptable to them only because they
bear similarities to some higher form of reasonableness.
For effective argumentation within an institution, this higher form of reason-
ableness is necessary, yet not sufficient. I certainly don’t want to claim that the
institution has no hand in determining what should count as reasonable and as
unreasonable for its arguing agents. What I think is the case is that the norms and
goals of the institution can play a role in the way in which this higher form of
reasonableness is put to work in actual cases of argumentation. In this respect,
Goodnight is right to note that the institution provides the ‘givens’ that arguers start
from in testing the acceptability of their standpoints, but the fact that arguers base
their discussions on these givens should not rule out that these givens become
themselves subject to critical testing.
Starting from an institution-based conception of rationality carries with it the risk
of assuming a certain hierarchy in analysing institutional argumentation. Goodnight
has made it clear that power is an important factor when it comes to how institutions
deal with one another. As a result, an agent affiliated with a powerful institution
may enjoy some privileges during an argumentative exchange with an agent not
affiliated with that institution. In the case of an exchange between a provider and a
client (e.g. a health specialist and a patient) it is obvious that the provider is in a
powerful position vis-a`-vis the client and that the latter is in need of the former’s
help and feedback. One, however, may be misled in thinking that it is rational for
the specialist to assume the role of the persuader and for the patient to assume the
role of receiver. Such view would deprive the client of any significant active role in
the exchange. The analyst, therefore, need not restrict himself to the ‘givens’ that
these agents themselves may start from but should take into account that a client is
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an equal party in the exchange who can also engage in persuasive argumentation
targeted at the specialist and can, despite his lack of expertise, also subject the
provider’s contributions to criticism. The analyst should show how in light of a
more encompassing notion of reasonableness arguers can manoeuvre strategically to
achieve their goals and how this reasonableness is sometimes undermined by, for
instance, the power relations that characterise the argumentative exchange at hand.
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s concept of strategic manoeuvring has given the
analyst more tools for identifying ways in which arguers can exploit the givens of
the institution to their own advantage (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2005). The
main thrust of their approach is that the analyst should not take the actual
asymmetry between arguers for granted but he should take them into account.
This is not to say, however, that Goodnight’s analysis of the way direct-to-
consumer advertising in the field of pharmaceutical industry affects exchanges
between doctor and patient is not extremely insightful. The analysis sheds light on
the way changes in institutional discourses can affect the possibilities of strategic
manoeuvring for institutional arguers and shows how the asymmetry between doctor
and patient may be adjusted in favour of one arguer or another. In the case analysed
by Goodnight it is the patient who benefits. The case can be considered as an
example of a form of strategic manoeuvring typical of the opening stage of a critical
discussion where parties exchange moves regarding the allocation of the burden of
proof. What can be concluded from this particular case is not that thanks to
regulatory changes it is now reasonable for the patient to impose more burden of
proof on the doctor—this burden of proof is there anyway—but that these changes
have, as Goodnight explains, given more room to the patient to manoeuvre
strategically. In addition, the analyst should not be tempted to assume that it is
necessarily unreasonable for the doctor to refuse to comply with the patient’s
demand that he assume the burden of proof. Within the boundaries of rationality, the
burden of proof remains an issue for discussion that arguers solve intersubjectively
independent of what a given institutional change may have imposed.
To conclude, both Goodnight’s approach and analysis have left no doubt that
argumentation theory can indeed benefit from the study of institutional discourse. In
this commentary I tried to show that while the insights gained from Goodnight’s
approach and analysis are indispensable for students of argumentation these insights
can be made even more useful if an institution-independent concept of reasonable-
ness is given more space within this approach.
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